I. INTRODUCTION
The recent influx of patent pools, research consortia, and similar cooperative groups led by companies at the vanguard of American innovation has raised a pressing question: How does collective action influence the incentive to innovate? This question hinges on how patent pools are internally governed -a topic that has not been deeply examined by legal scholars.
1 Through an original study of fifty-two [Vol. 27
In a landmark 1996 article, Robert Merges suggested that private collective action can resolve this problem. 13 Merges posited that private licensing groups such as patent pools occupy a middle ground between property regimes and liability regimes.
14 In this middle ground, groups of patent holders enter into private agreements in which they receive the ability to influence (albeit in a limited way) the royalties their inventions command. 15 This is achieved, Merges argued, through collective valuation procedures -e.g., negotiating or voting over decisions that affect royalty sharing. 16 Support for the foregoing theory, referred to herein as the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation, is suggested by a wealth of scholarly literature on collective valuation regimes in non-patent contexts. The Nobelist Elinor Ostrom, for example, documented communities around the globe that manage scarce natural resources through collective valuation procedures, such as democratic voting. 17 In the United States, law and economics scholars have observed similar collective property valuation systems at work in private condominium and neighborhood associations. 18 Land owners in the arid American West also rely on collective valuation to apportion access to water. 19 Examples like these lend support to the tantalizing possibility that patent holders can form enduring institutions that grant their members greater control over pricing than a compulsory licensing regime would. 20 If this hopeful theory is accurate, the policy implications would be significant: By granting their members control over pricing, such groups could overcome the risk of under-compensation that exists in compulsory licensing proposals. Such groups would also reduce transaction costs and holdout risks by aggregating complementary patent rights. If patent pools are indeed governed this way, policymakers and the interested public might be able to rely on the market to solve its own problems. 21 As patent licensing collectives form in im- 
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Power and Governance in Patent Pools 425 portant industries, the internal governance of these organizations is not only of academic interest, but also of immediate practical concern. In search of answers, this Article explores the realities of collective governance in patent pools. This study draws on collective patent license agreements spanning the years 1856 to 2013 and obtained from congressional records, regional repositories of the national archives, Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests directed to the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the Wisconsin State Historical Society, the New York State Library in Albany, and in several instances, directly from patent licensing organizations. 22 These contracts document nearly two centuries of scientific and industrial progress, from nineteenth century steelmaking to modern-day genetic research, and they describe in vivid detail the degree to which members of patent pools can influence their compensation. 23 Because some patent pools may have gone undocumented, and because many of the records that do exist stem from lawsuits and congressional hearings, there is a potential for sampling bias. In light of the paucity of empirical research on this subject, however, this Article significantly advances what is known about the degree of control over pricing that these groups afford to would-be inventors. Moreover, any sampling bias that does exist could just as easily downplay as exaggerate this Article's chief findings.
The discussion unfolds in three parts: Part II explains the pricing problem that afflicts our patent system and the theory that patent pools address this problem through collective patent valuation. Part III presents an original study of collective agreements that reveals gaps between theory and practice. Part IV discusses the normative results of this study and presents a proposal to mandate the recording of collective patent agreements with a federal agency. A brief conclusion follows.
II. THE PROMISE OF COOPERATION
Leading commentators believe that our patent system, by bestowing monopoly pricing power on patent holders, generates transaction costs that discourage innovation. 24 However, if licensing rates were 22 . Identifying, gathering, and reviewing these documents involved judicial, congressional, historical, and news database searches, and correspondence with historians and archivists. Where agreements were unavailable, this study relied on detailed descriptions of agreements provided in court decisions. Stewart Macaulay's landmark 1963 "gap study" of non-contractual relations in business heavily inspired this Article's methodology. See set by courts, Congress, or regulators, innovators would perceive a risk of under-compensation -a result that would likely reduce innovation investments below optimal levels. 25 Academics, industry participants, and policymakers have long and ineffectively sought to resolve this tension through government reforms. 26 Theory, and possibly empirical evidence, points toward an elegant solution: private collective licensing institutions. 27 
A. The Defect of Bargaining Regimes
Since Thomas Jefferson and James Madison famously debated whether their new republic should grant patents, American progress has been deeply tied to the "nuisance[]" (Madison's term) of monopolies. 28 To illustrate this relationship, scholars often say that patents signify a bargain between our society and its geniuses: In exchange for new and useful innovations, our patent system permits inventors to dictate the prices that consumers and licensees must pay. 29 This fictive bargain was struck in the Patent Act of 1790, and it endures today. 30 However, our understanding of how far the "nuisance" of patent pricing should reach has evolved.
Economic theorists have long viewed our patent system as a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies. 31 As instruments of exclusivity, patents spur supra-competitive pricing and subcompetitive levels of production. 32 Consequently, some consumers 25. Compare Merges, supra note 11, at 1307 (arguing that a compulsory patent licensing regime would lead to under-compensation), with Lemley, supra note 9, at 475 (arguing that non-optimal compulsory licensing rates can actually spur efficient bargaining).
26. [S] tandard economic theory predicts that a profit-maximizing producer with monopoly power will charge more and produce less than a producer in a competitive market . . . .").
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Power and Governance in Patent Pools 427 who would have been willing to pay competitive prices for patented products are unable to obtain them. 33 Economists view these abandoned transactions as a social deadweight loss that decreases shortterm economic efficiency. 34 However, an ideal patent regime would allow these short-term losses to be outweighed by the long-term dynamic gains that innovation can yield. 35 Viewing patents in these terms, early intellectual property scholars sought policies that would maximize incentives to innovate and minimize lost transactions.
36
As technology has evolved, so too have scholarly views on the full costs of our patent system. 37 The earliest patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") described complete products. 38 Today, by contrast, the technologies that fuel our economy, such as software and drugs, owe their provenance to hundreds and sometimes thousands of existing inventions that have been patented by different inventors. 39 Innovation in the twenty-first century unfolds before a vast mosaic of pre-existing devices, manufacturing processes, applied algorithms, and scientific research methods. Ours is an age of dispersed entitlements.
In a landmark 1998 article published in Science, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg predicted that the increasing diffusion of technology ownership would threaten long-term innovation. 40 The authors posited that, prior to investing time and money into any avenue of research, would-be innovators would seek to avoid infringing "upstream" patented research tools and methods. 41 This would entail several costly and uncertain steps: identifying all patents of possible relevance to a project, evaluating the scope and quality of those patents, and, finally, negotiating licenses with individual patent own- ers. 42 In addition to these transaction costs, there is the risk that individual patent holders will strategically hold out for prohibitively high fees during negotiations. 43 Heller and Eisenberg reasoned that the innovators who believed that these costs and risks would be too great would abandon their research plans altogether -a result they famously termed "the tragedy of the anticommons." 44 The related risk of holdouts is a second source of costs in the patent system. 45 The problem arises when a single buyer must purchase assets -e.g., land, patents, etc. -from numerous monopolists. Each monopolist who learns that her cooperation is essential to the buyer's plan strategically demands an exorbitant fee. This surplus fee (which is distinct from the supra-competitive prices that naturally arise in a monopoly setting) could reach as high as the total value of the buyer's project. 46 What results is a no-win situation: With each new agreement that is formed, the buyer becomes more committed to completing the entire project, and the remaining sellers become emboldened to hold out for ever higher fees. 47 Because buyers cannot pay a surplus to each seller who demands it, projects subject to holdout pricing tend to collapse. 48 Anticommons theory inspired a shift in scholarly focus away from the short-term costs of patents and toward the impact of patents on long-term innovation. Although foregone innovations cannot be empirically studied, patent bargaining failures have been welldocumented by intellectual property commentators. 49 For instance, in the realm of genetic research, Stephen Maurer described a patent exchange initiative that halted at a licensing impasse after years of nego- Today, some commentators debate the extent of the anticommons problem in various industries, but few dispute that the problem exists. 53 Experts believe that the courts, the PTO, and Congress are responsible for creating this problem. 54 Commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit, for instance, for encouraging excessive patent filings by relaxing subject matter restrictions in areas such as business methods and human genes. 55 Critics have also faulted the PTO's patent-friendly policies for contributing to a flood of patent filings.
56
Congress has been lambasted as well for enacting legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act, 57 which opened the door to a surge of new patent filings on the products of federally-funded research. 58 Critics believe that these policies have encouraged researchers to seek patent protection for basic tools and methods that, in an earlier age, would have been freely available. The belief that our government's institutions hinder innovation rather than encourage it has inspired a wave of reform proposals, some of which were included in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, that are designed to tailor the initial apportionment of patent rights. 60 Many such solutions would make patents harder to obtain by, for instance, increasing application fees, fortifying the standard for obviousness, and increasing the quality of PTO review.
61
Even bolder suggestions abound, which include placing a hard limit on the total number of patents issued each year and offering new kinds of patents that can be asserted only against certain types of infringers. 62 It is doubtful that any of these approaches to tailor the government's apportionment of patent rights will remedy the proverbial anticommons. The reason is simple: The transaction costs and holdout risks that fuel the anticommons problem could persist in a world with fewer patents. For example, in an industry where each of four firms holds at least one essential patent, prospective competitors must negotiate with all four firms. And, regardless of the number of patents that each owns, any of these firms could still decide to hold out and thereby cause an entire project to collapse. 63 Ultimately, the true "nuisance" of patent pricing lies not in the number of patents in a particular industry but in the number of patent holders with whom potential licensees must bargain.
64

B. The Defect of Liability Regimes
Some experts believe that the defects of bargaining over patent licenses could be avoided if the government, rather than patent holders, were to set patent licensing fees. 65 This solution is rooted in Guido Likening the law to a grand cathedral that can be portrayed from many perspectives, Calabresi and Melamed presented a new vision of legal ordering that united two seemingly disparate concepts -liability and property -under the common rubric of "entitlements." 67 A property entitlement roadblock, the authors explained, can be removed by paying off the entitlement holder. 68 For example, a homeowner's entitlement to exclude trespassers can be overcome if the would-be trespasser buys the house. By contrast, liability entitlements are extinguished through the payment of fees determined ex post by some organ of the state. 69 For instance, a tortfeasor who causes a car accident can eliminate his victim's entitlement to compensation by paying court-ordered damages.
Calabresi and Melamed proposed that lawmakers could enhance the level of economic efficiency in society by wisely selecting entitlements. 70 To illustrate this idea, the authors conjured a simple anticommons scenario: a real estate developer seeking to develop one thousand adjacent parcels of land into a park that he hopes to sell to a city. 71 If the developer is willing and able to pay every landowner an above-market price, in principle the park should be built. 72 In practice, the project will fail because individual landowners can hold out for excessive prices. 73 Calabresi and Melamed explained that this inefficient result could have been avoided if a court, rather than the landowners, had the power to set prices -i.e., if the land were governed by liability rules instead of property rules. 74 This example supports the authors' normative argument that liability rules are preferable when property entitlements cannot be effectively bargained for -precisely the conditions believed to fuel the patent anticommons. See id. at 1093-94 (arguing for "the set of entitlements which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off").
71. Although Calabresi and Melamed's The Cathedral has had a profound and lasting influence on intellectual property scholarship, subsequent scholarship has tended to advocate only a partial shift to compulsory patent licensing. 76 The chief concern is that government institutions could harm innovation incentives by under-compensating patent holders. 77 To appreciate this concern, one might consider how courts value entitlements in a paradigmatic liability setting: contract breaches. As every first-year law student learns, the standard award in contract disputes is expectation damages -an amount that places non-breaching parties where they would have been had the breach never occurred. 78 When expectation damages cannot be calculated, courts sometimes award reliance damages -a remedy that restores non-breaching parties to the economic position they were in before the contract was formed.
79 Courts determine these amounts by examining evidence produced by litigants and sometimes by considering industry information such as standard market prices. 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (2013) (defining reliance damages); FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 732-33, 757-58 (explaining that an injured party's reliance interest often serves as an alternate basis for contract awards).
80. Contract law disfavors property-like rules. For instance, injunctions and specific performance are only imposed with limitations. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 742-57 (explaining numerous limitations to the imposition of injunctions and specific performance as remedies in contracts disputes). Likewise, courts generally do not enforce ex ante "bargains" for the price of breach in the form of penalty clauses. Id. at 811 (explaining that stipulated damages are permissible when they reflect liquidated damages, but not when they serve as a penalty for breach).
It is easy to appreciate why valuing patents could be a far more complex and speculative endeavor than determining contract damages. Like contract remedies, optimal patent royalties would match the outcome of hypothetical market exchanges -i.e., entitlement holders' expectations. 81 If courts systematically awarded less than this value, innovation incentives would decrease. 82 However, unlike parties to a contract, patent applicants rarely hold well-defined expectation interests, making it difficult for a court to objectively gauge the royalties that a patent would have commanded in a voluntary exchange. 83 Another reason that compulsory licensing is more difficult than contracting relates to changes in the market for the patented technolo- (1997) ("The risk of undercompensation in such situations is pervasive given the inability to determine with accuracy the losses, both economic and subjective, that follow when individuals find that someone else has plucked away from them assets that they need for the operation of their own business."); Julian-Arnold, supra note 77, at 357 ("Absent sufficient protection, creators can no longer recover the cost of their investment in research and development, resulting in lower production, fewer trading opportunities and higher costs to the consumer.").
83. In recognition of this problem, some courts have required a high standard of proof to award lost profits in patent disputes. See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 348-49 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (requiring the injured party to prove its lost profits by the "strictest proof" and to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" facts relevant to the inquiry). But see Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Thus, the standard in private actions is that the patentee must establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that but for the infringement he would have earned the profits he asserts were lost.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Basing patent royalties on research and development costs as an alternative measure of compensation is also problematic. Patents are designed to empower inventors to charge the maximum that licensees are willing to spend, rather than the cost of research and development alone. See Adelman, supra note 8, at 1007 (explaining that theoretically a patentee can "engage in perfect price discrimination by charging each customer the maximum amount that particular customer would be willing to pay"); see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937) (defining a reasonable royalty in a patent infringement suit as an amount which a prospective licensee would be "willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit") (citing Rockwood v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1930)). For this reason, awarding costs alone would under-compensate innovators. Moreover, there are practical difficulties in determining the "cost" of obtaining a patent. As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have observed, patent licenses "reflect not only the expected profits of the patentee on the current innovation, but also the expenditures incurred by the patentees in research projects that failed to yield a patentable result." Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 71-72. [Vol. 27 gy. Unlike market participants, courts or Congress could not easily adjust patent royalties over time. A chief benefit of patent ownership is the freedom to raise or lower prices in response to changes in demand and cost. For instance, if a patented genetic research method became valuable ten years after the patent's issue date, the patent's owner could recoup her initial investment by demanding higher royalties. 84 Because it would not be feasible for government institutions to replicate this dynamism, compulsory patent licensing necessarily denies inventors their full monopoly return.
Empirical evidence supports the argument that inventors would be under-compensated in a compulsory licensing regime: In practice, courts often under-compensate patent holders for damages caused by past infringement. 85 Experiments designed to evaluate compulsory patent licensing have concluded "that although a scheme including compulsory licensing and rate regulation would lower some prices, it would also result in less market security, significantly less research in some fields, less public disclosure and transfer of technology, and increased administrative costs." 86 In sum, both bargaining and liability regimes engender pricing problems that hinder innovation. In our current bargaining regime, innovation is hindered by high transaction costs and the risk of holdouts due to the near-absolute power that patent holders have to set 84. See Adelman, supra note 8, at 999 ("It may be quite appropriate for the patentee to obtain a higher royalty from the second patentee owing, for example, to changes in demand and cost conditions since the first license was granted or to a desire to capture the benefits of one licensee's more efficient production methods.").
85. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (1978) ("The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the equivalent of ordinary royalty negotiations among truly 'willing' patent owners and licensees. That view would . . . make an election to infringe a handy means for competitors to impose a 'compulsory license' . . . ."); see also Fauver, supra note 8, at 667 n.9 ("When a government grants a compulsory license, the courts will ordinarily prescribe a royalty rate which would be less favorable to the patentee.").
86. See Adelman, supra note 8, at 986 n.35 (citing CHRISTOPHER THOMAS TAYLOR & Z. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 349-50 (1973)). It should be noted, however, that compulsory patent licensing may be helpful in settings unrelated to anticommons problems. See generally Fauver, supra note 8, at 685 (arguing in favor of a compulsory patent licensing plan). In 1982, the economist Pankaj Tandon proposed that compulsory patent licensing could enhance social welfare in some settings, although he noted that this conclusion relied upon simplified assumptions. Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 470, 483-84 (1982) . Cf. Merges, supra note 77, at 99 ("Although Scherer has shown that compulsory licensing has not on the whole been deleterious when applied as part of an antitrust remedy, he is also careful to limit his support to this context only."). Ian Ayres and Eric Talley have persuasively argued that the very existence of compulsory licensing rules can encourage patent holders to bargain privately. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 82, at 1094 ("Indeed, the inability of a court to tailor a damages award and the existence of litigation costs can often improve the ability of the parties to reach a consensual, efficient agreement on their own terms, not those dictated by the underlying liability rule."). Although liability rules might facilitate bargains in small concentrated settings, they have not been shown to encourage broader systemic forms of collective action of the kind believed to affect the process of innovation.
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Power and Governance in Patent Pools 435 licensing fees. By contrast, a liability regime could hinder innovation through systematic under-compensation -seemingly an unavoidable risk if patent holders are to be denied any control over the royalties they collect. However, there may be a middle road in which bargaining failures are averted, and in which inventors can influence the royalties they collect: collective patent valuation.
C. The Theory of Collective Patent Valuation
Property holders can, and often do, take steps to remedy propertypricing problems by forming private collective rights organizations. From condominium associations to agricultural collectives to musical copyright licensing groups, the design of such groups varies widely in practice. However, all operate on a simple principle: They permit property owners to draw value from what they own through systems of collective decision-making. Most commonly, this entails voting over key decisions that influence the distribution of wealth.
87 Such voting systems give individual property holders a degree of control over their profits that they would not otherwise enjoy under a compulsory licensing system. Thus, if patent pools truly promote innovation investments, one would expect them to follow a similar template.
Some of the best-documented episodes of collective property valuation appear in the studies of Elinor Ostrom. 88 A pioneer of the new institutional economics, Ostrom examined how self-governed communities preserve scarce natural resources. 89 This inquiry led Ostrom to visit resource-sharing communities around the globe -from remote Japanese villages to Swiss mountain towns. 90 Across such diverse settings, Ostrom identified a unifying theme: In one form or another, collective choice arrangements were almost always a basis for ongoing cooperation and efficient distribution of wealth and property in long-enduring collectives.
91
In one case study, Ostrom reported on an agricultural commune in Alicante, Spain that relied on voting to manage the use of water.
92 For centuries, the individual owners of water rights in the region had pooled their collective rights into a syndicate. 93 The Alicante irrigation syndicate leased these aggregated water rights out to small land- owners. 94 Members of the syndicate met regularly to vote over profit sharing and decisions related to securing contracts with outside water suppliers. 95 The group allocated one vote to each individual, rather than weighting votes based on, for instance, the size of property holdings. 96 Echoing the words of an earlier historian, Ostrom attributed the strength and stability of the Alicante irrigation syndicate to its "democratic and representative character." 97 Commentators have similarly documented the use of collective valuation procedures to govern the use of real estate. For example, empirical studies have revealed that voting is the basis for nearly all decision-making within condominiums. 98 In an article exploring the condominium model, Michael Heller and Rick Hills argued that private voting is an optimal means of managing property rights because it allows property owners, rather than government authorities, to set prices. 99 Experimental studies conducted by scholars in the field of public choice substantiate this assertion.
100
Public laws also draw on the power of democratic selfgovernance to manage property rights. 101 In a 2010 publication, Thomas Merrill reported on how home owners in New Haven, Connecticut voted over the question of whether to create a neighborhood historic preservation district. 102 This measure promised to increase the value of individual homes, but threatened to limit owner autonomy by restricting the exterior modifications that could be made to homes.
103
A Connecticut state law called for the decision to be voted on under "one-owner, one-vote" rules similar to those used by the Alicante irrigation syndicate. 104 The community ultimately decided against creating the district -a decision that Merrill believed was more legitimate at 288 ("Each owner of property having an assessed property tax valuation of at least $1000 on which property taxes were paid in the previous year is entitled to one vote.").
No. 2]
Power and Governance in Patent Pools 437
and informed than one that local government officials could have come to on their own. 105 Robert Merges has documented the use of collective decisionmaking in the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"). 106 ASCAP licenses its members' copyrighted musical works to outsiders in exchange for royalties which it distributes back to its members through a pro rata formula. 107 As Merges explained, members of ASCAP vote over major decisions, including the election of a "Classification Committee" that determines the royalties members receive. 108 Unlike the "one-owner, one-vote" rule used in the examples already discussed, ASCAP apportions voting power based on the number of times a member's musical work is licensed.
109
Merges reported that although some members have argued that this weighted voting system is undemocratic, most members appear to be pleased with how royalties are distributed.
110
Such empirical studies have inspired a vast body of theoretical literature on the virtues of voting over property. Public choice experts have observed that voting encourages deliberation and communication between rights holders, allowing property to be governed by the "wisdom of crowds." 111 Economic theorists believe that voting systems promote economic efficiency by allowing property holders to draw the maximum possible value from their individual assets. 112 Property theorists have opined that, unlike liability regimes, voting regimes allow those with the greatest familiarity and knowledge of a marketplace -owners -to set prices optimally. 113 Luminaries from the These observations support the alluring theory that patent holders can be expected to form private regimes that act as forums for collective valuation, reducing transaction costs and holdout risks while incentivizing innovation. The roots of this theory appear in a 1990 economics paper written by Yoram Barzel and Tim R. Sass in which the authors predicted that voting regimes would emerge to allocate resources among multiple property holders. 115 Several years later, Robert Merges posited that patent licensing institutions governed by voting rules "tend to emerge" in order to overcome bargaining problems. 116 Merges drew empirical support from the structure of two patent pools: a 1916 patent pool relating to folding beds and a 1917 patent pool relating to aircraft.
117 Merges' optimistic view is reinforced by the fact that antitrust authorities review the structure of patent pools in order to ensure they do not harm competition.
118
If private patent holders tend to preserve innovation even as they cooperate, then perhaps the proper focus of patent reform need not be on the government's apportionment or valuation of patents, but rather on fostering and monitoring private licensing collectives. In other words, perhaps the patent system does not need to be "fixed" after all.
The Theory of Collective Patent Valuation demands empirical study. Existing empirical literature on patent pools, while immensely valuable, has not explored the interaction between governance and innovation. 119 For example, economists Anne Layne-Farrar and Joshua Lerner examined rent-sharing formulas in modern standard-setting patent pools, but their work did not explicitly address how the governance of those pools related to innovation incentives. 120 The dearth of scholarship on this subject is due in part to the fact that the contracts that bind such organizations are not widely available. In fact, the only historical account of voting within patent pools appears in Robert Merges' 1996 publication on collective rights groups. 121 Thus, the possibility that private collectives will arise to cure our ailing pa- 
III. A STUDY OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE
Can we expect patent holders to privately remedy the pricing problems that threaten innovation? This question hinges on how patent pools are governed -a topic that has not yet been explored by legal scholars. In search of answers, this Part presents an original study of fifty-two patent licensing agreements in operation between 1856 and 2013. These contracts show that many patent pools place the power to apportion royalties exclusively in the hands of their founders. Newcomers, when they are permitted to join these groups, rarely have control over the royalties they draw. As a result, most patent pools do not support the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation. However, some such institutions may still be capable of encouraging innovation through "rough-and-ready" rent-sharing rules that benefit repeat players.
Because there is no single historical record of all patent pools, the information described here is drawn from numerous sources, including exhibits to antitrust lawsuits housed in regional repositories of the National Archives, records of congressional investigations on patent pooling, FOIA requests directed to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, the Wisconsin State Historical Society, the New York State Library in Albany, the files of academic historians, and in some instances, patent licensing organizations themselves. This study also draws on interviews with attorneys and executives directly involved in present-day licensing groups.
This study is as comprehensive as possible in light of available historical records. It is likely, however, that some groups of patent holders did not preserve records of their cooperation; others may have relied on oral agreements or tacit understandings that left no trace. As a result, there is a possibility of sampling bias. While this possibility should not be ignored, its significance should also not be overestimated. The set of episodes described herein may be incomplete but nonetheless unbiased, or biased in a way that only downplays this study's chief conclusions -i.e., the design of undocumented patent pools may be similar to the pools described herein.
The dates on which these groups formed are revealing. As the list in the Appendix shows, collective patent licensing in the United States reached a peak during the 1930s and then precipitously dropped off until the late 1990s. 123 One possible explanation for this pattern is the loosening and subsequent tightening of antitrust scrutiny during the early-to-mid twentieth century. 124 The recent resurgence in collective licensing, which began in the late 1990s, appears to have been primarily motivated by the development and widespread use of digital communications and media standards. 125 As of this writing, the upswing is continuing and has reached beyond such technological standards to pharmaceuticals and environmentally sustainable technologies.
126
A. Ex Ante Bargains
Of the fifty-two patent licensing groups in this study, twenty were not designed to apportion royalties to new patents. 127 Instead, these organizations carried out ex ante bargains related to products or methods in existence at the time of agreement. All such bargains delivered fixed royalties to their founders, as measured either in dollar amounts for every machine built by licensees, or by percentages of total incoming royalties. The static nature of these cooperatives obviated any need for elaborate systems of collective patent valuation. Future technologies were rarely contemplated in these agreements, let alone promoted by them. The following descriptions of three such groupsThe Singer Combination, the Consolidated Seeded Raisin Company, and the Indiana Manufacturing Company -offer important insights into the more complex arrangements described later in this Part.
The Singer Combination, as it was called, was America's first patent pool and is exemplary of the ex ante licensing structure. 
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web of cross-licenses and commitments wherein each member received permission from the others to manufacture a limited number of sewing machines of various types each year. 130 The price to be charged to consumers for each machine was dictated in the Singer Agreement, as were the royalties that each member would receive from outside manufacturers:
In case of any future license to other parties under the patents enumerated in the two last preceding sections, and owned by the parties hereto, the license fee shall be fifteen dollars for each machine for the right under all of the said patents . . . Because the founding members of the Singer Combination were sewing machine manufacturers as well as patent holders, the Singer Agreement also dictated the amounts that each member would pay the others for every machine they built and sold. 132 Because these sums were laid out in the agreement, it is clear that they were based entirely on ex ante bargaining. For instance, the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company promised to pay I. M. Singer & Company five dollars for every machine it manufactured in excess of an agreed upon number. 133 The Singer Agreement allocated no royalties for new (i.e., after-acquired) patent rights. 134 Some patent pools divided royalties to members based on percentages rather than fixed sums. 135 The United States Consolidated Seeded Raisin Company, a California-based patent licensing collective formed in 1900, is representative of this design: 136 The organization's founding members included four corporations and four individuals, each of whom owned patents on machinery and processes for raisin seeding. 137 These eight founders assigned their patents to a new corporation -the United States Consolidated Seeded Raisin Company -which was formed specifically to administer patent licensing and royalty sharing. 138 The agreement entered into by all members divided incoming royalties into five fixed percentages. 139 Tellingly, the contract recited the percentages that specific patents "earned," indicating that the group did not contemplate the inclusion of new patents or new members:
The royalties which shall be received upon license contracts issued under and by virtue of this agreement shall . . . Interestingly, the Seeded Raisin Agreement stipulated that royalty distributions between the group's founders would shift proportionally as individual patents were declared invalid by a court. 141 This provision adds a degree of dynamism to the United States Consolidated Seeded Raisin Company's royalty-sharing arrangement, but not the kind that would encourage innovation: It shifted royalties only in response to the invalidation of existing patent rights, but did not direct royalties to new patent rights.
In contrast to the Seeded Raisin and Singer Agreements, one patent pool based on ex ante bargaining did appear to contemplate future technologies: The Indiana Manufacturing Company ("IMC"), a corporation formed in 1895, acted as a clearinghouse for patent rights related to agricultural machinery. 142 In an agreement that accompanied its standard patent license to manufacturers, the IMC sought licensees' promises to "endeavor to improve upon Pneumatic Stackers," and to 
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convey to the corporation all future patent rights that covered such improvements. 143 In exchange for these promises, the IMC promised to pay licensees five dollars for each pneumatic stacker manufactured under its licenses. 144 Although this provision was forward looking, it dictated a fixed amount for any and all new patent rights rather than a procedure for collective valuation. In this respect, the provision placed inventors in essentially the same position they would find themselves in a compulsory licensing regime -entirely subject to valuations performed by an institution. 145 The above three agreements, along with a substantial proportion of documented patent pools, were not structured to act as forums for patent valuation and, therefore, do not bear out the predictions of the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation. Because these arrangements generally related only to patents in existence at the time of agreement, they had no need for procedures to determine the royalties that new patents would earn. There were simply not many ongoing decisions for these short-term oriented groups to make.
B. Corporate Dividends
Corporate issuance of dividends is a second mechanism that has been adopted to apportion royalties within patent pools.
146 Fifteen patent pools identified in this study were corporations that acquired full ownership of patents held by their members in exchange for stock that periodically yielded dividends. 147 Unlike the ex ante bargains described in the foregoing Part, these share-based groups were capable of directing a portion of their profits to the contributors of afteracquired patent rights. However, the decisions that governed the royalties that such patents earned -e.g., the amount of stock to be offered to an inventor in exchange for a patent, the amount of a given dividend distribution, the timing of dividend distributions -were made by officers of these organizations, and not by shareholders. As a 147. See id. Although many patent pools discussed in this paper were incorporated, only the pools described in this Part relied exclusively on the issuance of dividends as the mechanism for profit sharing. [Vol. 27 result, these share-based groups were not truly platforms or forums for collective patent valuation.
The Pneumatic Steel Corporation, a steel patent licensing group formed in the late-nineteenth century, illustrates the share-based design. 148 The group was born from a dispute: In the late 1850s, two American investor groups acquired patent rights to the "Bessemer process" -a breakthrough in steelmaking technology. 149 One group of investors held patents developed by Sir Henry Bessemer, the original inventor of the process. 150 A second group held a blocking patent derived from experiments with related processes.
151
Faced with this legal impasse, the two steelmaking concerns consolidated their patent rights -initially under a trust and later through a corporation. 152 The Pneumatic Steel Corporation, as it was named, granted the various patent holders and their beneficiaries dividendyielding stock in return for their assignment of patent rights. 153 Ten thousand shares were distributed in total.
154 These shares were distributed between the Kelley Process Company and the Albany investors based on the numerical ratio of patents that each group contributed.
155 Private correspondence between the group and one shareholder shows that dividends were distributed several times each year. 156. See Griswold Letters, supra note 152.
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It appears that the Pneumatic Steel Corporation either did not admit or, alternatively, did not attract outside patent holders: When the corporation was restructured as the Bessemer Steel Company in 1877, 157 the new corporation's articles of association listed only the patents originally held by the organization along with six afteracquired patents developed by the founding members. 158 This shows that, during its eleven years in operation, the Pneumatic Steel Corporation acquired no patents developed by outside inventors.
In addition to limiting the decision-making power of shareholders, some share-based patent pools limited the transferability of stock.
159 For example, a 1926 corporation that acquired patents on machinery and methods of removing the pits from peaches granted each of its two founders 2500 shares of common stock valued at $100 each. 160 A provision in the pooling agreement limited the availability of stock to potential newcomers:
The parties hereto agree that before either of them may sell or otherwise dispose of the whole or any portion of the capital stock of the Corporation, and in the event a bona fide purchaser shall be obtained therefor, the party so wishing to sell or otherwise dispose of such stock shall give written notice to the other party advising it of the terms of sale or disposition, and the party to whom such notice is given shall have fifteen (15) days after the giving of such notice within which to elect to purchase or acquire the stock so being offered for sale upon the same terms and conditions upon which the bona fide purchaser is willing to purchase or acquire said stock, and should such party elect to so purchase or acquire such stock, it shall have the right to so purchase or acquire the same on demand.
161
This limitation is consistent with the theme that united all fifteen share-based pools examined in this study: Despite being capable of inducing innovation by, for instance, making stock available to inno- 
C. Rough-and-Ready Formulas
In contrast to ex ante bargains and corporate decision-makers, profit sharing in most patent pools today is governed by individual evaluators whose authority is limited by profit sharing formulas. This system is less complicated than it may sound: Evaluators decide whether a new patent will be included within a given pool, and then profit-sharing formulas dictate the royalties the patent's contributor will receive. Of the fifty-two organizations analyzed in this study, six fit this design; all six related to technological standards, such as the MPEG video format, and the RFID and 3G wireless data protocols.
162
As the following examples illustrate, these groups favor "rough-andready" cooperation over democratic systems of collective valuation.
163
The MPEG-2 patent pool, which governs patents related to a variety of digital video technologies, demonstrates how formula-based royalty sharing works. The group was formed in 1997 by Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, Philips, Sony, and several other companies that held patent rights related to the underlying technology. 164 Today, the group's membership has expanded to over twenty patent holders. 165 The MPEG-2 patent pool allocates royalties to its members according to pro rata rules as follows: Thus, Sony, who as of this writing contributed 218 out of the MPEG-2 group's 494 total patents, is currently allocated forty-four percent of all royalties. 167 By valuing all patents equally, the MPEG pool's pro rata formula makes fine-grained patent valuations impossible. For instance, a new and valuable patent that required years of costly research would draw the same amount of royalties as a less valuable patent. As some commentators have observed, such formulas may create perverse incentives for members to simply file high numbers of patent applications and to claim that many patents are "essential."
168
Some standards-based patent pools have adopted more complex formulas to discourage such behavior. For instance, the RFID patent pool alters the pro rata formula such that "half of the royalties are allocated to participants based on the number of patents contributed by each participant, and the other half are allocated substantially equally among participants."
169 By hinging fifty percent of all royalties on the pure number of members within the group rather than the number of patents within the group, this hybrid approach could limit strategic patenting behavior. However, this formula arguably results in an even cruder division of royalties than a purely pro rata formula.
170
A second type of formula adopted by some groups gradually apportions fewer royalties to patents over time. The DVD patent pool, for instance, allocates royalties to patent holders on the basis of how old their patents are. 171 According to the group's organizers, this for- 170. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the value of an individual patent within a licensing group is more closely a product of the total number of patents within the group than the total number of members.
171. See Letter from Carey R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, to Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the Dep't of Justice (Oct. 9, 1998), [Vol. 27 mula was selected to encourage contributors to license new and valuable patent rights to the collective. 172 This approach seems to assume that older patents are always less valuable than newer ones. As such, graded royalty sharing, like pro rata distributions, appears as a roughand-ready approximation of patent value.
All formula-based groups charge a single decision-maker with the task of determining whether or not to include a new patent in the mix. As a result, the only way that a prospective innovator could influence his profits in a formula-based regime is by helping to define the standard around which a patent pool is organized. The MPEG-2 patent pool provides a helpful example of how this can be done. Between 1988 and 1994, the MPEG-2 standard was drafted and defined by an open working group of engineers and experts from over one hundred technology companies. Collaboration was coordinated by a standardsetting entity called "ISO/IEC."
173
Once the first draft of the MPEG-2 standard was defined, several members agreed to allow two outside experts to identify patents that were "essential" to the technology. 174 Entities that held one or more essential patents included many participants in the standard-setting group, including Columbia University, Fujitsu, General Instrument, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Scientific-Atlanta, and Sony. 175 These founding organizations agreed to a pro rata royalty division formula, 176 and formed an independent limited liability company called "MPEG LA" to administer licensing and royalty collections. 177 In this way, only organizations that participated in the standard-setting process for MPEG LA had opportunities to have their patented technologies incorporated into the final standard, and consequently, into the patent pool.
178
Although formula-based patent pools do not value individual patents carefully, their lack of precision may be compensated for over available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/request-letters/302365.pdf (discussing the impartial expert valuation of those patents in the pool after the first two year, then every four years, in order to determine the fraction of royalties to be granted to that patent) [ 
D. Patent Assessors
Two organizations analyzed in this study compensated innovators based purely on the valuations of patent assessors selected by the group. 179 Because these two groups offered patent contributors a voice in valuation decisions, they most clearly support the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation.
The first patent pool to include an assessor was the 1917 Manufacturers Aircraft Association ("MAA"), an organization formed to facilitate the production of military aircraft during the First World War. 180 The MAA's membership agreement included the following provision, which dictated how such assessments would be made:
When a "Subscriber" shall hereafter acquire a United States airplane patent, or any right thereunder, he shall be entitled to compensation for the use thereof if the patent or patent right covers an invention which secures the performance of a function not before known to the art . . . or is otherwise of striking character or constitutes a radical departure from previous practice . . . . Such report and claim shall be submitted to a Board of Arbitration to be selected in the manner provided for in paragraph XIII hereof, which Board shall determine whether such compensation shall be paid, and, if so, the total amount thereof and the rate of royalty, or other payments, which shall be paid . . . .
181
When the MAA formed, industry and government regulators were concerned that this provision's compensation scheme would unfairly allow the group's founders to access new patents for uncompetitively low prices. 182 Prompted by these concerns, the U.S. Attorney General conducted an investigation of the MAA in 1917. 183 The Attorney General acknowledged that the compensation scheme could harm competition, but also noted that it served a useful purpose by "keeping the patents of each of the subscribers open to all." 184 In light of this, he stated that any concerns about the agreement's potential for abuse "scarcely justif[y] its condemnation in the absence of such abuse." 185 The second example of an organization employing patent assessors demonstrates a unique solution to the problem of patent valuation. In 1933, multiple oil companies held overlapping patents on a valuable process of oil refining. 186 To avoid litigation, the companies cross-licensed these patents to each other on a royalty-free basis. 187 To reward the owners of any after-acquired patents, the companies agreed to a two-tiered pricing approach in which arbitrators divided royalties only if the members could not come to an agreement on their own first. 188 Here, the assessors were a "backup" only to be relied upon when ordinary bargaining failed.
These two groups offered newcomers a surprising amount of influence over their potential profits. The MAA's membership agreement tasked an internal board of arbitrators with determining which (if any) future innovations were of a "striking [enough] character" to merit compensation. 189 The board was to be composed of three individuals: one elected by the inventor seeking compensation, a second elected by the MAA's board of directors, and the third chosen by the other two arbiters.
190 At least two of the three arbiters had to agree for any decision to become effective.
191
A slightly different representative voting system was used in the HC Technique Agreement among the oil refiners. 192 Unlike the MAA, the HC Technique Agreement relied on representative voting as a backup, only to be used in situations where members of the group were unable to agree upon a fair division of royalties:
[T]he parties shall endeavor to agree as to a fair division of royalties with respect to said [after-acquired patent rights] and, failing such agreement, the parties 182. See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass'n -Antitrust Laws, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 166, 170 (1920 193 As in the MAA, a majority vote of the arbitrators was required for any royalty-sharing decision to pass. 194 This system granted prospective contributors a limited degree of control over the royalties they could collect via the vote cast by the arbitrator they selected.
195
E. Royalty-free Licensing and Cost Savings
Many patent pools offer important cost savings to their members. These savings include access to shared patent rights, immunity from challenges to patent validity, and joint funds to offset litigation and patent prosecution costs. The desire to lower costs may explain why patent holders voluntarily join licensing collectives that offer limited control over royalties, and in some cases, no royalties at all.
Nine institutions examined in this study were not structured to collect or to distribute royalties to patent holders. 196 Instead, these groups were formed purely to reduce the risk of patent infringement litigation by requiring each member to provide every other member a royalty-free license to its covered patent rights. As one would expect, these agreements were formed by companies that were both licensors and prospective licensees -that is, they manufactured potentially infringing products but also held patents of their own.
The royalty-free institutional design was first adopted by the Automobile Manufacturers Association ("AMA") -one of the most significant patent licensing collectives in industrial history. 197 Formed in 1914 by a set of leading automobile manufacturers, the AMA at one time pooled rights to over one thousand automobile patents contributed by hundreds of members.
198 As a condition of membership, [Vol. 27
Linux System . . . ." 218 The Agreement defines the "Linux System" as only encompassing software with existing functionality. 219 Thus, like all of the royalty-free licensing groups examined in this study, the OIN delivers a fixed return of "zero" to its members and focuses exclusively on facilitating licenses for patent rights to existing technologies rather than for future innovations.
Some patent licensing groups not only grant their members access to mutually held patents, but also grant them access to patents owned by non-member licensees. For instance, the RFID standard license discussed earlier requires that any licensee holding an essential patent is required to make the patent available to members on "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms." 220 The MPEG-2, DVD, and Bluetooth licensing groups provide similar terms. 221 In addition to affording their members access to patented technologies, most of the groups examined in this study discourage invalidity suits directed at members' patents. This was most commonly achieved through contractual terms that allowed termination of collective agreements with licensees who challenged the validity of any patent in a portfolio. 222 Like American pioneers "circling the wagons," these groups marshaled a defensive force that can only be accomplished through cooperation.
Another cost reduction made possible by many patent pools, unrelated to royalty-free status, is access to shared legal funds. A majority of the episodes examined by this Article allocated incoming royalties to help members defend infringement and invalidity suits and to fund prosecution of new patent applications. This practice dates back to the earliest patent pool examined in this Article -the 1856 Singer Collective -which provided that all incoming royalties "shall be set apart as a patent fund until it amounts to ten thousand dollars, to be used for the protection and enforcement of [the pooled] patents." 223 Over time, the uses for such funds expanded. For instance, the 1900 Seeded Raisin Company provided "a fund of not less than five thousand ($5000.00) dollars for the specific purpose of paying counsel tions. Moreover, these rules are simple to administer and appear to require less coordination than a more complex voting procedure would require. Although these rules may encourage some companies to innovate, enthusiasm for this approach should be tempered: The companies most likely to profit from this "game" are those that own enough patents to participate multiple times.
A second alternative approach yields important cost savings without even attempting to collectively value patents. Many patent pools are structured to provide their members with access to valuable pools of patents and knowhow as well as access to after-acquired patent rights of licensees. Many also provide patent contributors access to joint funds designed to offset the costs of enforcing or defending patent rights, and to help pay for prosecuting new patent applications. It appears that the benefits of joining some patent pools relate more to savings than to compensation.
The foregoing observations can be reduced to a digestible set of insights: There is little support for the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation. To the contrary, many patent pooling agreements are not designed to include new patent rights over time. Most of those that are capable of including new patents over time do not offer their members any power to influence the royalties they collect. In lieu of collective valuation procedures, an increasing number of such patent pools are turning to rough-and-ready royalty-sharing rules that appear to benefit repeat players. Thus, some patent pools may indeed be capable of encouraging innovation, but the incentive is likely only strong for companies that have enough patents to play the game multiple times. Smaller patent holders may still be drawn to patent pools for benefits unrelated to compensation, however, such as access to shared patent rights and litigation funds.
These conclusions do not disprove the theory that patent pools encourage innovation. However, they do show that the role of collective behavior in our patent system is far more complex than theorists have predicted. The link between institutional design and innovation has long been unappreciated, in large part, because patent pooling agreements are not visible to policymakers or to the public.
B. A Proposal for the Recording of Patent Pooling Agreements
This Article's findings show that private institutions have long had a significant and largely unappreciated impact on innovation incentives and returns. However, as explained in Part II, policy efforts to reform the patent system have generally focused on the institutions that define it -namely, the PTO and the Federal Circuit. In order to better encourage innovation, future patent reform efforts should be informed by the role of private institutions. To that end, I propose that
